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Combining data from a newly created global terrorism database and a 
chronological index of deaths from the conflict in Northern Ireland, I evaluate 3,328 
terrorist attacks perpetrated by Northern Irish groups between 1969 and 1992.  I assess 
whether responses to terrorism increase or decrease subsequent terrorist activity using 
two competing theoretical perspectives.  While rational choice theories assume that 
government intervention decreases terrorism by increasing the costs of crime, legitimacy 
theories suggest retaliation may increase terrorism by decreasing the legitimacy of the 
government.  Using Cox proportional hazard models, I estimate the impact of six 
government interventions on the hazard of a terrorist attack.  My results provide minimal 
support for rational choice theories but ample support for theories of legitimacy.  In five 
of the six cases examined, government intervention resulted in increased activity for at 
least one terrorist group.  Overall, my results support the conclusion that military-oriented 
counter terrorism may be counterproductive.   
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
Among criminologists, a longstanding debate concerns whether harsh, immediate 
responses to criminal behavior increase or decrease subsequent deviance.  The classical 
perspective in criminology maintains that certain, swift and severe punishment will 
reduce the likelihood of future deviant behavior through deterrence.  However, a number 
of researchers criticize this notion, suggesting that severe punishments may decrease 
government legitimacy and provoke additional criminal activity instead (see Braithwaite, 
2002; Tyler, 1990; Tyler, 2000; Sherman, 1993).  In this paper I test two competing 
perspectives that have been applied to the crime of terrorism, the rational 
choice/deterrence perspective and the theory of governmental legitimacy.  Rational 
choice/deterrence theories assume that government retaliation increases the perceived 
costs of crime, thereby decreasing terrorist strikes.  Conversely, the theory of legitimacy 
asserts that government retaliation decreases the perceived legitimacy of the government, 
thereby increasing terrorist activity.   
The rational choice perspective, a model of human choice based on the rational 
calculation of costs and benefits, has consistently been applied to a variety of criminal 
behaviors including robbery, burglary, drunken driving, income tax evasion, shoplifting, 
drug selling and white collar crime (Dugan, LaFree & Piquero, 2005).  For three decades, 
rational choice theories have also been used to understand types of political violence 
including assassinations, guerilla warfare and terrorism (for examples see Brophy-
Baermann & Conybeare, 1994; Chauncey, 1975; Dugan et al, 2005; Enders & Sandler, 
1999; Landes, 1978; Minor, 1975; Ross, 1993).  On the contrary, the competing 
  2
perspective of governmental legitimacy has only recently begun to be applied to the 
crime of terrorism (see Braithwaite, 2002).     
In this paper, I directly test whether responses to terrorism increase or decrease 
subsequent terrorist activity.  Specifically, I employ hazard modeling to estimate the 
impact of counter terrorism on the hazard of attacks perpetrated by Northern Irish 
terrorist groups between 1969 and 1992.  In a similar analysis of the effectiveness of 
counter terrorism, Enders and Sandler (1993) delineate passive and active responses to 
terrorism.  Passive responses include erecting barriers such as metal detectors, hardening 
targets, and imposing stricter laws and penalties.  Active responses encompass retaliatory 
raids, preemptive strikes and covert actions.  My research analyzes two passive responses 
and four active responses to terrorism.  The passive responses, Diplock Courts and 
Criminalization/Ulsterization, were introduced by the British government during the 
1970s.  The active responses, Falls Curfew, Internment, the Loughall Incident and the 
Gibraltar Incident, were carried out by British and Northern Irish security forces 
throughout the conflict.   
Compelling arguments support the efficacy of both passive and active responses 
to terrorism; however there are some indications that active responses, in particular, may 
generate retaliatory violence (see Collins, 2004; Geraghty, 2000; Kenney, 2003; 
Lichbach, 1987; Malvesti, 2002; Nevin, 2003; Soule, 1989; Turk, 2002).  Though not an 
exhaustive list of government actions, the six responses I selected represent the vast 
majority of British interventions, and provide a useful test of the effectiveness of counter 
terrorism in Northern Ireland.  In addition to testing hypotheses derived from 
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assumptions of the rational choice theory, this analysis allows me to evaluate differences 
in how groups respond to government intervention.   
Previous research regarding the effectiveness of counter terrorism is limited by an 
absence of reliable empirical data.  As a result, much of the current literature presents 
anecdotal, qualitative assessments (see Eppright, 1997; Malvesti, 2002; Mason, 1996; 
Roberts, 2002; Shapiro & Suzan, 2003; Shultz, 1979; Wilkinson, 1996).  Prior research 
on Northern Irish terrorism offers valuable insight as well, however the conclusions 
reached in these studies are often speculative (see Jeffery, 1990; Lee, 1981; Reilly, 1994; 
Sacopulos, 1989; Soule, 1989).  In contrast, my research benefits from twenty-three years 
of data obtained from a newly created global terrorism database that catalogues terrorist 
events in Northern Ireland.  For this study I adhere to the definition of terrorism used in 
creating the database, which refers to the threatened or actual use of illegal force and 
violence to attain a political, economic, religious or social goal through fear, coercion or 
intimidation (LaFree & Dugan, 2002).   
Northern Ireland provides an appropriate test of the effectiveness of counter 
terrorism for three reasons.  First, British responses to terrorism provide a diversity of 
interventions which involve both active and passive responses.  Second, the primary 
groups involved in the conflict, the Nationalists and the Loyalists, have both used 
terrorist tactics.  Although Nationalist groups consistently perpetrated acts of terrorism at 
a higher rate than Loyalist groups, over time, general trends in the frequency and lethality 
of attacks follow relatively similar patterns on both sides (see Figures 1 and 2).  
Interestingly however, only the Irish Nationalists were the focus of consistent military 
campaigns.  As such, I expect the three military responses which directly targeted 
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Nationalist groups to affect only Nationalist terrorism.  Conversely, I expect the 
remaining three responses, directed at terrorism in general, to affect both Nationalists and 
Loyalists.  Admittedly, Loyalist terrorism offers an imperfect comparison group, as 
government intervention targeting Nationalists may have indirectly affected Loyalists as 
well.  However, I believe the comparison is worthwhile because depending on the results, 
it may bolster the argument that government intervention, and no other unmeasured 
variable, is responsible for observed changes in terrorism trends.  Third, Clutterbuck 
(2004) argues that Northern Irish extremists were the progenitors of modern terrorism.  
This alone qualifies Northern Ireland as a singularly interesting case study.   
Although I will refer to the opposing groups of terrorists involved in this conflict 
as Nationalists and Loyalists, I do not mean to imply that all Nationalists or all Loyalists 
in Northern Ireland are terrorists.  I am simply referring to those Nationalists and 
Loyalists who engage in terrorism.  Sinn Fein, the political arm of the Irish Republican 
Army (IRA), and the Social Democratic and Labor Party (SDLP) legally pursue the 
Nationalist agenda through politics.  Likewise, the Democratic Unionist Party and the 
Ulster Unionist Party pursue the Loyalist agenda (CAIN Web Service).   
History of the Northern Irish Conflict 
Before presenting an analysis of Northern Irish terrorism, it is necessary to 
provide a brief summary of events leading up to the outbreak of violence in 1969.  In 
1801, the Act of Union combined Ireland and Great Britain into a single kingdom, known 
as the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland (Geraghty, 2000).  This merger 
abolished Irish parliament in Dublin and implemented direct rule by the United Kingdom 
from Westminster.  In 1916, an Irish Nationalist named Michael Collins led an uprising 
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in opposition to British rule in Ireland.  Easter Rebellion, as it was called, incited a swift 
and violent response resulting in the execution of many Nationalist leaders at the hands of 
the British (McGloin, 2003).  The executions further angered Irish Nationalists and 
convinced the newly formed IRA to forge a violent campaign against the British 
(McGloin, 2003).  The result of the civil unrest was the 1920 Anglo-Irish Treaty, an 
agreement between England and Ireland in which the British government granted 
independence to the 26 southern counties of Ireland while retaining control over the six 
counties in the north.  The northern region, comprised of Antrim, Down, Armagh, 
Londonderry, Tyrone and Fermanagh has subsequently come to be known as Northern 
Ireland.   
Britain’s division of Ireland was a strategic move, designed to ensure a Protestant, 
or Loyalist majority in Northern Ireland that would likely be in favor of the union 
between Britain and Ireland (McGloin, 2003).  In the eyes of Irish Nationalists, Britain 
retained control over Northern Ireland for another reason as well, to ensure Britain’s 
continued ability to exercise economic control over Ireland as a whole (Cox, 1998).  
Despite the eventual abatement of serious violence in the region, the division between 
Protestants and Catholics continued, as did Nationalist sentiment that British rule in 
Ireland was unacceptable (McGloin, 2003).  In the late 1960s, Irish Nationalists, inspired 
by the civil rights movement taking place concurrently in the United States, began a full 
fledged protest against the perceived political and economic discrimination in Northern 
Ireland (McGloin, 2003).  The Nationalist IRA also remained committed to the original 
goal of a united Ireland entirely independent from Britain.  According to Nationalists, 
Britain was occupying their country by force and therefore an armed struggle was 
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justifiable and necessary to rid Northern Ireland of the British (Alonso, 2001).  Thus 
began the civil rights movement in Northern Ireland which has come to be known as ‘the 
Troubles.’   
Relevant Terrorist Organizations 
Oglaigh na hEireann or ‘the Irish Volunteers,’ was established in November of 
1913 to “secure and maintain the rights and liberties common to all the people of Ireland” 
(McDowall, 2003).  In 1919, when this organization officially became known as the IRA, 
it comprised several military groups, all committed to fighting for Ireland’s independence 
from Britain (Sutton, 1994).  Following the division of Ireland in 1920, support for the 
organization gradually diminished.  However, with the beginning of the Troubles in the 
late 1960s, the IRA quickly reemerged (Sutton, 1994).  Within a few months, the IRA 
split into two factions, the Provisional IRA (PIRA) and the Official IRA (OIRA).  ‘The 
Officials,’ though not adverse to the use of violence, felt that “a single-minded dedication 
to physical force would lead to…sectarian war and would never unite the whole people of 
Ireland” (Bell, 1997, p. 371).  In May of 1972 the OIRA declared a unilateral ceasefire 
(Bell, 1997).  PIRA, alternatively referred to as ‘the Provisionals’ or ‘Provos,’ is 
generally considered synonymous with the IRA (Lee, 1981).  The United States and 
Britain classify the IRA as a terrorist organization because the group’s tactical objectives 
include attacking British armed forces and political leaders, as well as bombing civilian 
targets in order to undermine British authority and government legitimacy (Soule, 1989).   
Although the IRA is the most prolific and well known of the Nationalist terror 
groups in Northern Ireland, it is by no means the only one.  The Irish National Liberation 
Army (INLA), a splinter group of the OIRA, was founded in 1972 in response to 
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dissatisfaction with the OIRA’s declaration of ceasefire (Sutton, 1994).  This group 
initially called themselves People’s Liberation Army, and has also committed terrorism 
under the names People’s Republican Army and Catholic Reaction Force.  The INLA 
announced a ceasefire which came into effect in August of 1998.  The Irish People’s 
Liberation Organization (IPLO) broke from the INLA in late 1986, and the British 
government forced the group to disband in 1992.   
While Nationalist paramilitary organizations desperately fought for Northern 
Ireland to be free of British rule, paramilitary organizations loyal to Britain were equally 
committed to the prevention of this outcome.  Rather than attacking British interests, 
Loyalist terrorists predominantly targeted Nationalists and other civilians (Sutton, 1994).  
The most active of the Loyalist groups that used terrorist tactics were the Ulster 
Volunteer Force (UVF) and the Ulster Defense Association (UDA).  The UVF first 
emerged in 1966, with an announcement to the Belfast press that asserted: “From this day 
on we declare war against the IRA and its splinter groups.  Known IRA men will be 
executed mercilessly and without hesitation” (Lee, 1981, p. 112).  The UVF was banned 
by the British Government after a series of killings in the late 1960s (Sutton, 1994).  
Although the ban was lifted during 1974, it was re-imposed the following year after 
another string of terrorist attacks.  The UVF have also claimed attacks using the names 
Protestant Action Force and Protestant Action Group (Sutton, 1994).  The UVF entered 
into a ceasefire in October of 1994.  The UDA was formed in 1971 as a Loyalist military 
group, but have never claimed responsibility for any terrorist killings.  Instead they have 
attempted to preserve their legitimacy by engaging in terrorist activity under the name 
Ulster Freedom Fighters (Clare, 1998).  The UDA was eventually declared illegal by the 
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British government in late 1992.  Other splinter groups exist but will not be discussed 
because they were formed after 1992, the final year of this study.   
Involvement of British Security Forces  
In 1969, with violent demonstrations by Nationalists continually being met with 
equally violent counter-demonstrations by Loyalists, Northern Ireland virtually dissolved 
into sectarian conflict (McGloin, 2003).  The police force in Northern Ireland, the Royal 
Ulster Constabulary (RUC), and a locally recruited militia, the Ulster Defense Regiment 
(UDR), were ill equipped to respond to the demonstrations and often resorted to brutality 
and violence themselves (Reilly, 1994).  The UDR, who frequently conducted searches at 
designated checkpoints, occasionally beat, or shamed Catholic citizens in front of their 
families (Soule, 1989).  As Gerry Adams, the leader of Sinn Fein, pointed out, many 
Catholics in working class areas were sympathetic to the IRA and unable to see its 
members as terrorists (Lee, 1981).  According to Adams, IRA members were known to 
local civilians not as staff officers Maguire and O’Connor, but as “Mrs. Maguire’s wee 
boy” and “Mrs. O’Connor’s son whose wedding you attended” (Lee, 1981, p. 40).   
As allegations of differential treatment of Catholics and Protestants by the mostly 
Protestant (generally upwards of 90 percent) RUC and UDR became commonplace, Irish 
Catholics and Nationalists began to perceive the RUC as illegitimate and undeserving of 
cooperation (Reilly, 1994).  In 1969, when Britain deployed their army to help contain 
the violence, Nationalists were not surprised to discover that the army also engaged in 
differential treatment of Catholics and Protestants.  Some researchers have suggested that 
British and Northern Irish security forces functioned more as active participants in the 
conflict than as objective peacekeepers (Jeffrey, 1990; Lee, 1981).  Whatever the case, of 
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the 363 people killed during the Troubles by the army and the RUC, 145 were Nationalist 
paramilitaries and only 14 were Loyalist paramilitaries.  The remaining 192 casualties 
were civilians (Sutton, 1994).  As a Northern Irish newsmagazine analyzed the situation, 
the IRA’s “strategy, whether deliberate or accidental, was to provoke confrontations with 
the security forces…and then base its recruitment on the repressive measures adopted by 
the Army as a result” (Lee, 1981, p. 124).   
During the early years of the Troubles, one event in particular created an 
atmosphere of distrust in the government among Northern Irish Catholics.  The events of 
January 30, 1972, otherwise known as ‘Bloody Sunday,’ were perhaps the most 
important turning point in the Irish civil rights movement (Geraghty, 2000).  During a 
civil rights march organized to protest the recent implementation of internment without 
trial, peaceful protesters intended to march from the outskirts of Londonderry to the city 
center.  The Parachute Regiment of the British Army, responsible for policing the event, 
blocked entry to the city center and denied passage to protesters.  As the marchers 
approached the line of troops, a small group of young people began to throw stones at the 
soldiers (Geraghty, 2000).  A major arrest operation by the army ensued.   
Whether any shots were fired at the troops remains a matter of some dispute, 
however, members of the Parachute Regiment proceeded to fire 108 shots at the crowd 
killing fourteen Catholic protesters and injuring thirteen others (Geraghty, 2000).  The 
British government asserted that the slain protesters had been IRA members while 
witnesses insisted they were unarmed civilians.  Events such as Bloody Sunday prompted 
one IRA member to acknowledge only half jokingly that “the British security forces are 
the best recruitin’ officer we have” (Geraghty, 2000, p. 36).  Due to the unplanned nature 
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of the event, for the purposes of this paper, Bloody Sunday will not be considered a 
counter terrorist action.  However, I will control for any effects of the event in my 
analysis.        
This research evaluates six distinct governmental actions directed against the 
Northern Irish terror groups between 1969 and 1992.  Falls Curfew, Internment, the 
Loughall Incident and the Gibraltar incident represent active responses carried out by the 
British military.  The remaining responses, Diplock Courts and the implementation of 
Criminalization and Ulsterization, are passive interventions.  Ideally, a comprehensive 
evaluation of the Northern Irish conflict would present data ranging from 1969, when 
violence first erupted, until after 1998, when the last of the major Nationalist and Loyalist 
terror groups entered into a long-term ceasefire agreement.  However, the dataset 
employed here represents the most complete information source currently available.  It is 
appropriate for my particular research question because the majority of governmental 
interventions involving the British military fall within the timeframe of these data.          
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CHAPTER 2 
Theoretical Basis 
The Rational Choice Perspective  
The roots of rational choice theory extend back to the classical school of 
criminology and the work of philosophers Cesare Beccaria and Jeremy Bentham.  
Advocates of free will, Beccaria and Bentham believed that man could determine his own 
destiny through the use of reason and knowledge (Moran, 1996).  The principle of utility, 
advanced by Bentham, proposes that individuals act in their own self-interest and 
therefore, effective punishment will deter individuals from engaging in specific actions 
that serve their self-interest.  Contemporary rational choice models of crime often express 
this utilitarian philosophy in mathematical terms, illustrating that individuals choose from 
a set of alternatives, selecting the alternative that offers the greatest benefit and lowest 
cost (Cornish & Clarke, 1986).  Mathematically, if p(success)*benefits > [1-
p(success)*costs], then crime is more likely to occur.  Alternatively, if 
p(success)*benefits < [1-p(success)*costs], then crime is less likely to occur (Dugan et al, 
2005).   
Modern rational choice theory, as advanced by Cornish and Clarke (1986), 
assumes that offenders are rational people who seek to maximize their pleasure and 
minimize their pain.  In essence, the rational choice perspective suggests that individuals 
take advantage of opportunities to commit a crime when the expected benefits exceed the 
expected costs (Nagin & Paternoster, 1994).  Expected benefits include tangible gains as 
well as psychological benefits including the thrill of breaking the law.  Expected costs 
relate to the certainty and severity of the anticipated punishment, as well as the strength 
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of moral regret (Nagin & Paternoster, 1994).  Rational choice models assume that 
offenders calculate their probability of success when deciding whether to engage in future 
criminal activities.  Cornish and Clarke (1986) separate this decision making process into 
two parts: criminal involvement decisions and criminal event decisions.  Involvement 
decisions deal with the choice to engage in crime, as well as the decision to continue with 
and to withdraw from deviant activity.  Event decisions involve a choice between various 
tactics and types of crime.    
Although it may be tempting to characterize terrorists as irrational, the literature 
frequently supports the notion that terrorists are rational actors who pursue their interests 
while attempting to maximize goals and minimize risk (Enders et al, 1990; Enders & 
Sandler, 1999; Lichbach, 1987).  Sandler, Tschirhart and Cauley (1983) explain that 
terrorists rank the tactics they use with regard to personal risk and the probability of a 
confrontation with authorities.  For example, Sandler et al (1983) demonstrate that high-
risk activities, such as hijackings and hostage takings, have the lowest incidence among 
terrorist acts.  Conversely, lower-risk activities like bombings and assassinations have the 
highest incidence.  The rational choice approach does not imply that terrorists always 
make good decisions, or that their decisions are particularly well thought out, it simply 
emphasizes that decisions, however quick and undeveloped, are made.  Moreover, certain 
variables play a role in the selection of one choice over another (Silke, 2003).   
Three variables, when combined, produce an expected cost of punishment: the 
probability of arrest, the probability of conviction and the severity of punishment 
(Mendes, 2004).  The choice of terrorism presumably loses appeal when legal 
ramifications increase in severity, or when the costs of terrorism outweigh the benefits, 
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however, these presumptions may not hold for suicide bombers.  Additionally, as 
potential terrorists observe other terrorist activity being carried out successfully, they may 
be more likely to engage in similar terrorist acts themselves.  Costs specific to terrorists 
include the threat of injury or death and the possibility of being captured, tortured or 
imprisoned (Frey & Luechinger, 2002).  Again, these costs depend upon the terrorist, and 
may not be applicable to suicide terrorism. 
Rational choice models suggest that crime can be deterred through appropriate 
public policy.  Accordingly, policy makers and officials who create systems of 
punishment endeavor to control this calculation through policies and actions aimed at 
reducing the likelihood of success (Dugan et al, 2005).  Enders and Sandler (1999) 
describe the underlying choice process occurring between the terrorists and the 
intervening government as follows,  
First, the terrorists decide their allocation of resources between terrorist and nonterrorist 
activities.  Second, they allocate their terrorism-designated resources among various 
modes of operations.  Since a government’s terrorism-thwarting or terrorism-sponsoring 
policies may impact the relative price of terrorist versus nonterrorist actions, the 
terrorists’ resource supply, or the relative prices of alternative attack modes, these 
policies influence the decisions of the terrorists (p. 148).     
Counter terrorist activities have the potential to reduce terrorism by imparting a 
sense of legitimacy to the intervening government through the arrest and trial of terrorists 
(Nevin, 2003; Turk, 2002).  From a theoretical perspective, a government viewed as 
legitimate is a less attractive target than one seen as illegitimate because the former likely 
enjoys more popular support.  Popular support of the government translates into 
opposition to the terrorists’ cause, which results in fewer recruits and less benefit to the 
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terrorists.  Military operations, such as the assassination of terrorist group leaders, may 
serve as a deterrent, raising the cost of terrorism by disrupting the operations of the 
terrorist group (Rasler, 1996).  Similarly, attacks targeted against specific terrorist 
organizations may drastically reduce group membership (Kenney, 2003).  Finally, Nevin 
(2003) argues that government actions involving force may impede the recruitment of 
new members to terrorist groups by increasing the perceived risk of participating in 
terrorist activities.   
Contrary to these arguments, some researchers challenge that history has proven 
counter terrorist actions, especially those involving the military, to be ineffective in 
reducing terrorist activity (Braithwaite, 2002; Geraghty, 2000; Lichbach, 1987; Soule, 
1989; Turk, 2002; United States Institute of Peace, 2002).  According to Shultz (1979), 
insurgency situations that evolve over a substantial period of time generate intense 
emotion and ideological commitment.  As such, terrorists’ willingness to incur costs in 
order to achieve goals may increase beyond the point of rationality.  In essence, Shultz 
(1979) explains that intangible benefits such as ideology, indoctrination, dedication and a 
desire to “rally to the cause,” all contribute to the decisions made by terrorists (p. 453).  
Shultz (1979) concludes that when the behavior of terrorists results from several factors 
not easily understood by counterinsurgents, the importance of rationality comes into 
question.  These conclusions suggest that the rational choice perspective may be an 
inappropriate theoretical framework to apply to terrorism. 
Indeed, recent findings suggest that counter terrorism involving the military not 
only fails to reduce terrorism through deterrence, as rational choice theories predict, it 
actually increases terrorism by provoking a retaliatory response (Collins, 2004; Malvesti, 
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2002).  According to Nevin (2003), violent military action runs the risk of increasing 
public support for terrorism by transforming slain terrorists into martyrs, thereby 
decreasing the legitimacy of the government.  Achieving martyr status often allows 
terrorist groups to recruit members more easily, increasing the benefits of terrorism 
overall.  Indeed, much research in this area supports the argument that deterrence-based 
counter terrorism is not only ineffective, but potentially counterproductive (Collins, 2004; 
Geraghty, 2000; Kenney, 2003; Lichbach, 1987; Malvesti, 2002; Nevin, 2003; Soule, 
1989; Turk, 2002).   
The effectiveness of deterrence-based crime policies has also been challenged by 
several reviews of the deterrence literature (see Nagin & Paternoster, 1991; Paternoster, 
1989; Tyler, 1990).  Nagin and Paternoster (1991) concluded that overall, deterrence-
based policies had a very minor impact on criminal behavior.  Consistent with this 
finding, MacCoun (1993) asserts that at best, variations in the perceived certainty and 
severity of punishment explain five percent of the variance in criminal behavior.     
Theories of Governmental Legitimacy 
Several arguments contrary to the rational choice perspective seek to explain the 
paradox of ineffective deterrence-based policies (Braithwaite, 2002; Shultz, 1979; Tyler, 
1990).  Over the past twenty years, research has provided especially widespread support 
for theories of legitimacy (see Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992 for reviews).  
According to Tyler (1990), perceptions of government legitimacy stem from perceptions 
of procedural justice.  Procedural justice concerns the fairness of the processes by which 
enforcement decisions are made.  The procedural justice model has two components.  
The first is the role of procedural justice in shaping people’s reactions to government 
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decisions.  Procedural justice theorists argue that people accept decisions because of the 
manner in which they are made (see Tyler, 1990; Tyler, 2000; Tyler, Degoey & Smith, 
1996).  The second component of the procedural justice model is concerned with the 
manner in which people determine the fairness of the government action.  The relational 
model of procedural justice (Tyler & Lind, 1992) proposes that procedural justice 
judgments develop from people’s reactions to the interpersonal aspects of their 
experiences with authorities.  In other words, perceptions of government legitimacy stem 
from the level of fairness people associate with government policies rather than the actual 
outcome of the policy (Tyler, 2000).   
The relational model of procedural justice suggests that citizens care about the 
quality of their treatment by authorities, because it communicates information about their 
stature within society (Tyler, 2000).  To be treated with respect and dignity signals to 
people that they are valued members of society who are entitled to recognition of their 
rights.  According to the relational model, three relational judgments determine the 
perceived legitimacy and fairness of the sanctioning agent: neutrality, trustworthiness and 
status recognition (treatment with dignity and respect).  The neutrality of the sanctioning 
agent stems from their evenhandedness, their lack of bias and their willingness to make 
objective decisions (Tyler, 2000).  The trustworthiness of the sanctioning agent relates to 
the benevolence of their motives, while perceptions of status recognition relate to polite 
and respectful treatment by authorities (Tyler, 2000).  According to Tyler (2000), the 
procedural-relational underpinnings of legitimacy are crucial to the effectiveness of 
government policy.   
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Also a proponent of legitimacy theories, Braithwaite (2002) challenges the 
simplistic view of deterrence taken by rational choice theorists.  Instead, he supports the 
more complex conception of deterrence put forth by Brehm and Brehm (1981), in their 
theory of psychological reactance.  Similar to the rational choice perspective, this theory 
suggests that when a government escalates deterrent threats, a deterrence curve with a 
positive slope results.  However, the theory of psychological reactance also posits that a 
defiance curve, with a negative slope, results simultaneously.  Therefore, whether 
deterrence works as expected depends upon the positive slope of the deterrence curve 
being steeper than the negative slope of the defiance curve (Brehm & Brehm, 1981).   
Defiance theory itself, proposed by Sherman (1993), seeks to understand how 
criminal sanctions account not only for deterrence, but for defiance or irrelevance as well.  
Sherman (1993) and Tyler (1990) assert that law enforcement and other types of social 
control work only when carried out in a manner their targets perceive as legitimate and 
procedurally fair.  Combining Tyler’s (1990) results with defiance theory, Braithwaite 
(2002) concludes that deterrence effects will exceed defiance effects when sanctions are 
seen as the result of fair procedures.  According to Braithwaite (2002), when terrorists 
provoke sanctions that are perceived as unfair, deterrence is “engendered 
counterproductive by defiance” (p. 4).  Braithwaite (2002) goes on to suggest a more 
dynamic approach to deterrence-based counter terrorist policies.  This approach, 
described by Braithwaite (2002) as a responsive regulatory pyramid, begins with 
restorative justice techniques (the base of the pyramid), then, if necessary, escalates 
through a hierarchy of forms of deterrent justice.  Finally, if deterrence fails, the 
intervening government resorts to ‘incapacitative justice’ (the apex of the pyramid), 
  18
which involves either incarcerating or killing the terrorists.  Braithwaite (2002) 
hypothesizes that had the United States employed a similar policy toward Iraq during the 
Gulf War and toward Afghanistan in 2001, the Muslim world would be less resentful and 
defiant toward Americans today.  Instead, according to Braithwaite (2002), in both cases, 
the U.S. intervened with excessive deterrence followed by insufficient de-escalation of 
deterrence.   
Review of the Literature 
A review of the literature reveals a near consensus that government interventions 
influence (in one direction or another) the level of terrorist violence within their 
boundaries.  However, widely variable and sometimes contradictory findings leave the 
nature of this influence uncertain.  First, I discuss the results of several studies that 
confirm the deterrent effect of counter terrorism.  Next, I detail findings contrary to the 
rational choice perspective, which lend support to theories of legitimacy instead.   
Support for the Rational Choice Perspective 
Theoretically, deterrence-based policies alter terrorists’ behavior by raising the 
costs of terrorism enough to exceed the benefits (Prunckun & Mohr, 1997).  Accordingly, 
government regimes design counter terrorist strategies that deliver quick, forceful 
punishment, believing that such swift and severe actions will minimize impending 
terrorist strikes.  To a certain extent, the literature supports this belief.  In their rational 
choice evaluation of transnational terrorist events, Enders and Sandler (1993) examined 
several U.S. counter terrorism policies implemented between 1968 and 1988.  Enders and 
Sandler (1993) determined that the most effective policies were the implementation of 
metal detectors in airports in 1973, and the fortification of U.S. embassies in 1976.  Each 
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policy reduced terrorists’ likelihood of success by increasing the certainty of 
apprehension.  Metal detectors proved particularly effective in decreasing threats and 
hoaxes, presumably because the benefits of making a threat decreased when such threats 
were no longer taken seriously.  Similarly, Chauncey (1975) evaluated five deterrence-
based policies designed to reduce hijackings.  In agreement with Enders and Sandler 
(1993), Chauncey (1975) found that metal detectors produced the largest reduction in 
hijacking attempts.  Enders, Sandler and Cauley (1990), as well as Dugan et al (2005) 
concur, finding that the installation of metal detectors reduced all types of aerial 
hijackings.  Dugan et al (2005) also concluded that hijackings to Cuba decreased 
following a 1970 Cuban policy that declared hijacking a crime.   
Using a slightly different approach, Prunckun and Mohr (1997) documented the 
frequency and severity of terrorist acts surrounding a single severity-based measure: the 
U.S. raid on Libya in 1986.  The Regan administration devised the raid as a warning to all 
Nations that the United States would no longer tolerate state support of terrorism.  
Prunckun and Mohr (1997) concluded that while their examination of the U.S. raid on 
Libya produced inconclusive findings, their results were consistent with an overall 
deterrent effect on international terrorism.  Specifically, the authors reported that despite 
an immediate upsurge, the frequency of attacks against U.S. targets decreased over time.  
Additionally, the post raid period witnessed a decline in Libyan-associated terrorist 
activity.  Prunckun and Mohr (1997) noted that although worldwide levels of terrorism 
failed to decrease following the raid, the post raid period was characterized by 
increasingly less severe incidents.  Malvesti (2002) reached a similar conclusion 
regarding the 1993 U.S. missile attack on Iraq.  This retaliatory attack on the Iraqi 
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Intelligence Service was designed to deter Saddam Hussein’s support for terrorist 
activities.  Malvesti indicated that subsequent to the U.S. attack, Iraq refrained from 
targeting U.S. interests for many years. 
Providing additional support for the deterrent value of military action, three 
studies addressed Israel’s counterinsurgent strategies.  Eppright (1997) evaluated Israel’s 
1996 incursion into Lebanon, which enjoyed the immediate tactical success of 
significantly reducing, if not completely stopping Hezbollah’s rocket attacks on Israel.  
Similar to the effects reported by Prunckun and Mohr (1997), Brophy-Baermann and 
Conybeare (1994) concluded that violent Israeli reprisals convinced Egypt and Jordan to 
discontinue their support of terrorist operations.  Finally, according to Greener-Barcham 
(2002), the Israeli commando raid of a hijacked aircraft in 1976 greatly diminished 
hostage situations and airline hijackings in the years following the event.  The success of 
these three violent reprisals supports the rational choice assumption that deterrence 
results when the certainty and severity of punishment increases.   
Evaluating several non-violent government actions, Chalk’s (1998) study focused 
on Peruvian counter terrorism.  In order to combat the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary 
Movement and Sendero Luminoso, the Peruvian government enacted several highly 
repressive certainty-based sanctions between 1992 and 1996.  Not only did Peru refuse 
bail to accused terrorists, they prohibited cross examination by defense lawyers and 
prevented defense lawyers from challenging judges’ decisions.  According to Chalk 
(1998), by 1996, the repressive policies effectively destroyed the support bases of both 
groups, greatly diminishing the threat they posed previously.   
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In each case presented above, the governments of the United States, Cuba, Israel 
and Peru employed various deterrence-based counter terrorist policies with apparent 
success.  Although these cases provide ample support for the rational choice perspective, 
the literature also provides support for the opposing theoretical perspective of legitimacy.      
Support for Governmental Legitimacy Theories 
Counter terrorist activities may fail because such measures, though directed 
against enemy combatants, often have a profound, negative effect on innocent civilians as 
well.  This diminishes the perceived legitimacy of the government and to the extent that 
citizens feel unjustly repressed, increases the defiant response of the society (Lichbach, 
1987).  Not surprisingly, terrorists often attempt to lure the government into overreacting, 
provoking the use of unconstitutional measures (Chalk, 1998).  In 1980, after a rescue 
attempt failed to free several U.S. diplomats taken hostage in Tehran, the Regan 
administration encountered a similar scheme (Wilkinson, 1996).  Out of desperation, the 
government obtained the release of the hostages through a secret conspiracy to supply 
weapons to Iran in return.  The whole affair greatly undermined the legitimacy of the 
government (Wilkinson, 1996).  
Turk (2002) asserts that collateral damage is inevitable in all military operations.  
Further, Lichbach (1987) suggests that civilians caught up in the destructive path of the 
military may go beyond questioning governmental legitimacy; they may perceive the 
military as the enemy and join the terrorists’ cause (see also Nevin, 2003; Turk, 2002).  
Military air strikes, for example, may reduce counterinsurgent casualties, 
…by replacing ground troops with airborne technology, but they do not discriminate 
between rebel supporters and non-supporters.  Thus, air strikes deny non-supporters the 
option of avoiding sanctions by refraining from providing any assistance to the rebels.  
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The result is that civilian nonelites, motivated by the same desire to survive the conflict 
regardless of who wins, may look to the rebels as the one group that can offer them 
protection from indiscriminate government violence (Mason, 1996, p. 80). 
In this sense, counter terrorism that relies on military force may backfire.  Similarly, 
Wilkinson (1996) explained that in any large conflict, it must be assumed that the 
terrorists have garnered at least some support among the general population.  If so, an 
unnecessarily great military presence may escalate the level of violence by polarizing the 
pro and anti-government factions within the community (Wilkinson, 1996).   
In an assessment of the United States’ 1998 attempt to subdue terrorist activity in 
Afghanistan, Malvesti (2002) alleged that the strikes increased Osama bin Laden’s 
popularity throughout the region.  She also concluded that the military intervention 
intensified public animosity toward the U.S., and may have contributed to the events of 
September 11, 2001.  Although Malvesti (2002) does not explicitly tie the reaction of the 
Afghan people to a questioning of U.S. legitimacy, her findings lend support to the 
assertion that military counter terrorism produces defiance rather than deterrence.  
Roberts (2002) concurs with Malvesti, concluding that the 2001 U.S. bombing campaign 
in Afghanistan inspired a defiant response as well.  Roberts (2002) explains that despite 
attempts to minimize civilian casualties, the U.S. targeted Taliban military assets which 
happened to be located in the centers of towns.  Collateral damage caused by the 
bombings prompted accusations that the United States places little value on Afghan lives, 
thereby undermining the legitimacy of the U.S. government (Roberts, 2002).  Though 
both Malvesti (2002) and Roberts (2002) provided compelling arguments to support their 
claims, it is worth mentioning that neither of the researchers presented data to reinforce 
their assertions.   
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To the contrary, Nevin (2003) conducted molar analyses to determine whether 
retaliation against terrorists reduced or increased subsequent terrorism.  Using a rational 
choice perspective, Nevin (2003) examined seven cases including Palestine, Morocco, 
Algeria, Northern Ireland, Spain, Sri Lanka and Peru.  He found no evidence that 
retaliatory attacks decreased terrorist activity.  Instead, Nevin (2003) reported that the 
intensity of terrorist actions either increased, or decreased less, following a more severe, 
violent retaliation, a finding in direct contradiction to the expectations of rational choice 
theory.  Nevin (2003) concluded that violent responses to terrorism should be avoided, as 
they not only fail to reduce terrorism, they harm innocent civilians and may increase 
recruitment for terrorist groups.  These conclusions provide support for legitimacy 
theories rather than rational choice theories.         
In direct opposition to the findings reported by Prunckun and Mohr (1997) 
(discussed in the previous section), Malvesti (2002) suggests that the U.S. military 
campaign against terrorism in Libya produced a defiant effect.  Malvesti (2002) found 
that the U.S. strikes generated an amplification of terrorist violence, culminating in the 
1988 hijacking of a Pan Am flight which took the lives of 270 people.  Collins (2004) 
quantitatively supports Malvesti’s assertions, demonstrating that military air strikes 
conducted by the U.S. in 1986 were related to a large increase in the lethality of incidents 
involving Libyan terrorists.  Collins (2004) demonstrates that in the five years prior to the 
military action, Libyan supported terrorism claimed 91 lives, however, over a similar 
length of time following the strikes, 491 people were killed in such incidents.  These 
numbers represent a 440 percent increase in the number of fatalities due to Libyan 
supported terror.  The discrepancies between the findings presented by Malvesti (2002) 
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and Collins (2004) and those reported by Prunckun and Mohr (1997) illustrate the 
difficulty of interpreting trends in terrorist activity without the benefit of statistical 
analysis.  Enders et al (1990) explain that although the U.S. strikes generated an 
immediate surge in terrorist activity, the surge was followed by a sustained reduction in 
resource using incidents and an increase in threats and hoaxes (which use no resources).  
Enders et al (1990) conclude that retaliatory raids such as the attack on Libya should be 
avoided, as they impose short-term costs without any long-term benefits.    
Another contradictory finding pertains to the 1973 installation of metal detectors 
in airports.  In their analysis of terrorist skyjackings, Cauley and Im (1988) discovered a 
‘substitution effect’ associated with this certainty-based policy.  Consistent with the 
findings discussed in the previous section, Cauley and Im (1988) concluded that the 
installation of metal detectors resulted in approximately three fewer hijackings per 
month.  Contrary to the other findings however, Cauley and Im (1988) noted that the 
installation of metal detectors was associated with approximately eight more non-
hijacking terrorist events per month (Cauley & Im, 1988).  According to the rational 
choice perspective, terrorist groups select their tactics by balancing the costs and benefits 
that come from government responses to their activities (Lichbach, 1987).  However, 
Cauley and Im (1988) explain that when an intervening government represses a certain 
tactic, rather than being deterred from terrorist activity entirely, terrorists may simply 
defy their oppressor by altering their mode of attack.  In so doing, the terrorists are 
rethinking criminal event decisions, while remaining steadfast in the criminal 
involvement decision (see Cornish and Clarke, 1986).  Cauley and Im (1988) argue that 
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the substitution phenomenon is a fundamental problem faced by authorities who attempt 
to thwart terrorism. 
The current literature provides empirical support both in favor of and in 
opposition to deterrence-based counter terrorism.  The rational choice/deterrence 
perspective garners robust support from studies evaluating the installation of metal 
detectors in airports, a passive, non-violent response to terrorism.  Conversely, the most 
convincing evidence in support of legitimacy theories comes from analyses of active, 
military counter terrorism.  Overall, the literature generally supports the idea that while 
non-violent responses to terrorism may be effective, violent, military-oriented responses 
appear counter productive. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Current Focus 
Selected Counter Terrorist Measures  
After a review of British counter terrorism policy during the Troubles, I selected 
six government actions.  The actions, listed in chronological order by date of occurrence 
or implementation are Falls Curfew, Internment, Diplock Courts, 
Criminalization/Ulsterization, the Loughall Incident and the Gibraltar Incident.  These 
interventions represent every significant government action during the Troubles with the 
exception of several acts, such as the 1974 Prevention of Terrorism Act, which did not 
substantially alter British policy, and the Good Friday Agreement, which took place in 
1998, after the final year of this study (see CAIN Web Service; Campbell & Connolly, 
2003; Geraghty, 2000; Jeffrey, 1990; Lee, 1981; McKittrick, Kelters, Feeney, Thornton 
& McVea, 2004; Reilly, 1994; Soule, 1989).   
Falls Curfew 
On July 3, 1970, a 36 hour military curfew was imposed by the British 
government and enforced by British soldiers in the Falls Road area of Belfast.  According 
to Campbell and Connolly (2003), this incident was the closest Northern Ireland had 
come to martial law since the 1920s.  In an attempt to locate IRA members and discover 
stockpiles of weapons belonging to the terrorist group, the army conducted extensive 
house searches and severely restricted the activities of those living in the area.  During 
the curfew, the army made over 300 arrests, confiscated approximately 100 weapons and 
21,000 rounds of ammunition (Jeffrey, 1990).  From a rational choice perspective, the 
Falls curfew and search operation increased the terrorists’ certainty of apprehension.  
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Although the British Army was successful in many ways, they were also responsible for 
the deaths of four civilians and severe damage to several homes (Campbell & Connolly, 
2003).  Further, Campbell and Connolly (2003) argue that use of military force in this 
situation, at least beyond the initial hours of the curfew, was unnecessary and probably 
unlawful.  This coupled with the destructive manner in which the searches were 
conducted and the army’s inability to distinguish between terrorists and civilians, have 
been said to have undermined the legitimacy of the government and alienated civilians 
throughout the area (Geraghty, 2000; Jeffrey, 1990).  For the purposes of this paper, I am 
considering Falls Curfew an active response to terrorism.   
Internment 
Slightly more than one year later, the British government’s policy of Internment 
allowed for the arrest and detention of suspected terrorists without any type of trial 
(Geraghty, 2000).  On August 9, 1971, the day the policy took effect, 342 people were 
arrested through a series of raids across Northern Ireland.  Following the arrests, the 
Minister of Home Affairs for Northern Ireland stated, “I have taken this serious step 
solely for the protection of life and the security of property…We are, quite simply, at war 
with the terrorist” (Deutsch & Magowan, 1974).  The arrests made were based on lists 
drawn up by the RUC.  However, those arrested included some who were no longer 
active members of a terrorist group and others who had never been involved in any 
paramilitary activity (Coogan, 1995).  Throughout the entire Internment period (which 
lasted until late 1975) nearly 2,000 people experienced detention without trial.  Of the 
detainees, over 1,800 were Nationalists and 107 were Loyalists.   
  28
Internment, which increased the certainty of apprehension, should, from a rational 
choice perspective, decrease future criminal behavior.  However, several scholars 
consider this policy a failure (Campbell & Connolly, 2003; Geraghty, 2000; McKittrick 
et al, 2004; O’Brien, 1999; Soule, 1989).  On August 15, 1971, the major Catholic 
political party in Northern Ireland, the SDLP, announced that it was starting a campaign 
of civil disobedience in response to the introduction of Internment.  The SDLP then 
indicated that they would not become involved in any political talks while Internment 
continued (CAIN Web Service).  The following day, over 8,000 workers went on strike 
in protest of the policy they perceived as unfair.  Regarding Internment, one soldier 
remarked, “It has, in fact, increased terrorist activity, perhaps boosted IRA recruitment, 
polarized further the Catholic and Protestant communities and reduced the ranks of the 
much needed Catholic moderates” (CAIN Web Service).  Though many opinions exist, 
the effectiveness of Internment has yet to be assessed quantitatively.  I consider 
Internment an active government response to terrorism.    
Diplock Courts 
In 1972, shortly after the implementation of Internment, the British government 
established a committee to investigate possible changes to legal procedures in cases 
involving terrorists.  The committee, headed by Lord Diplock, recommended that these 
cases be heard by a single judge with no jury (Geraghty, 2000).  This recommendation 
stemmed from concerns over possible juror bias and witness intimidation in cases 
involving terrorists (Jackson & Doran, 1995).  The committee also proposed relaxed 
standards for the admission of coerced confessions and advocated allowing the 
uncorroborated testimony of so-called ‘supergrasses’ or snitches (Jackson & Doran, 
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1995).  These recommendations were introduced as law on August 8, 1973, as part of the 
Northern Ireland Emergency Provisions Act.  Courts of this type became known as 
‘Diplock Courts’ (Geraghty, 2000).  The introduction of Diplock Courts effectively 
increased the certainty of punishment for terrorists by eliminating jury trials, a 
development rational choice theorists connect with a deterrent effect on criminal activity.  
By Enders’ and Sandler’s (1993) definition, the implementation of Diplock Courts 
represents a passive response to terrorism.       
Criminalization and Ulsterization 
Dissatisfied with the effectiveness of Internment, in 1976 the British government 
established a working group of bureaucrats, civil servants, military and intelligence 
personnel to examine the future of policy in Northern Ireland.  The group came up with 
an approach known as ‘The Way Ahead’ (Jeffrey, 1990).  Moving away from the strategy 
of military primacy, the resulting policy abandoned Internment and adopted 
Criminalization and Ulsterization instead (Campbell & Connolly, 2003).  Prior to the 
implementation of Criminalization on March 1, 1976, paramilitary prisoners in Northern 
Ireland had been considered political detainees and they were treated very differently 
than ordinary criminals (Jeffrey, 1990).  Before Criminalization, jailed terrorists enjoyed 
‘Special Category Status’ which allowed them privileges such as the right to wear their 
own clothes, to interact with other prisoners, to have extra visits, to avoid working within 
the prisons and to participate in educational and recreational activities (von Tangen Page, 
1998).  Based upon the findings of a 1975 investigative commission into prison practices 
in Northern Ireland, Criminalization revoked the aforementioned rights in an attempt to 
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strip away the political nature of terrorism, treating it instead as an ordinary crime.  The 
findings of the commission were the following: 
The housing of male special category prisoners in compounds means that they are not 
closely controlled as they would be in a normal cellular prison…and they are more likely 
to emerge with an increased commitment to terrorism than as reformed citizens.  The 
special category prisoners regard themselves in much the same light as detainees, 
expecting that an amnesty will result in their not having to serve in full the sentences 
imposed on them by the courts…The result of this is that the sentences passed in the 
courts for murder and other serious crimes have lost much of their deterrent effect (Lee, 
1983, p. 133-134).   
These recommendations emphasized the need to increase the deterrent value of 
punishment in Northern Ireland.  Although the rational choice perspective predicts that 
raising the costs and decreasing the benefits of terrorism should produce a deterrent 
effect, thereby reducing terrorist activity, some researchers theorize that Criminalization 
may have increased terrorist activity instead (Geraghty, 2000; Lee, 1981).  One 
mechanism by which Criminalization may have increased terrorism is the loss of 
government legitimacy that occurred during the hunger strikes in Northern Irish prisons.  
On March 1, 1981, the fifth anniversary of the implementation of Criminalization, the 
imprisoned leader of the IRA began a hunger strike hoping to reintroduce Special 
Category Status for jailed terrorists.  Although the strikes resulted in the starvation deaths 
of ten Nationalist prisoners over eight months, government policy remained unchanged.  
According to Bew and Gillespie (1993), Nationalists achieved a huge propaganda victory 
over the British government and also obtained a lot of international sympathy during the 
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strikes.  Although Criminalization has been studied extensively, its effectiveness as a 
measure of counter terrorism has yet to be assessed using longitudinal data.   
On March 25, 1976, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland announced the 
implementation of Ulsterization.  Ulsterization, also known as ‘police primacy,’ shifted 
responsibility for policing the security situation in Northern Ireland from the British 
military to local authorities, the RUC and UDR (Jeffrey, 1990).  Like Criminalization, 
this dramatic reduction in the role of the British Army was intended to portray terrorism 
as criminal, rather than political (von Tangen Page, 1998).  Ultimately, the policy was 
intended to decrease the benefit of engaging in terrorism, by eliminating the notion that 
terrorist acts were a necessary part of a political struggle.  The effects of this policy will 
be considered in conjunction with the effects of Criminalization because the 
implementation dates are extremely close and the intended consequences nearly identical.  
I consider Criminalization and Ulsterization passive responses to terrorism.        
The Loughall Incident 
On May 8, 1987, eight members of the IRA were shot and killed during an 
ambush by British soldiers in Loughall, County Armagh.  The IRA paramilitaries were in 
the process of bombing the police station at Loughall, a tiny, mostly Protestant village, 
when approximately 40 British Special Air Service (SAS) soldiers surprised them 
(Geraghty, 2000).  Using a mechanical digger, the terrorists carried a 200 pound bomb 
nine miles to the police barracks.  An informer compromised the operation prior to the 
bombing and as a result, SAS soldiers learned the likely route of the terrorists as well as 
the type of bomb to expect (Geraghty, 2000).  The soldiers later confirmed that they fired 
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at least 600 shots at the terrorists; however, the IRA still managed to detonate the bomb 
as planned (McKittrick et al, 2004).  
The Loughall Incident provides an important example of British military counter 
terrorism because it was the highest loss of life suffered by the IRA in any single incident 
since the 1920s (O’Brien, 1999).  It also represents a change in British strategy from 
policy based counter terrorism back to outright military force.  According to O’Brien 
(1999), the message to the IRA was clear, “men caught in the act could be shot dead, no 
prisoners taken” (p. 141).  The terrorists killed were all members of the IRA’s East 
Tyrone brigade, and by all accounts were virtually irreplaceable (Geraghty, 2000; 
McKittrick et al, 2004; O’Brien, 1999).  One of the men was suspected of murdering two 
RUC officers and another, known as ‘The Executioner,’ had killed a former Member of 
Parliament (Geraghty, 2000; O’Brien, 1999).  Two of the men had over 12 years 
experience with the IRA.  To further illustrate the dangerousness of the terrorists killed 
on that day, weapons recovered from the scene were later linked to seven murders and 12 
attempted murders (O’Brien, 1999).  From a rational choice perspective, the deterrent 
value of this event should have been immense.  The soldiers effectively raised the 
perceived costs of engaging in terrorism, increased the severity of punishment, and 
decreased the terrorists’ likelihood of success during this active, forceful response to 
terrorism.  However, the soldiers shot, rather than arresting the terrorists.  The IRA likely 
construed this action as unfair and public perceptions of governmental legitimacy may 
have decreased as a result.  The Loughall Incident is an active response to terrorism.      
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The Gibraltar Incident  
On March 6, 1988, in a similar incident of active, military counter terrorism, SAS 
soldiers killed three members of the IRA under controversial circumstances in Gibraltar 
(O’Brien, 1999).  The terrorists, who planned to explode a car bomb during a changing of 
the guard ceremony, had been under surveillance by the SAS for several months 
(McKittrick et al, 2004; Murray, 1998).  Among the IRA’s most experienced activists, 
the bomb team included a high ranking intelligence operative and an explosives expert 
(O’Brien, 1999).  The killings generated a great deal of controversy when witnesses 
challenged the official version of events, claiming that the terrorists were unarmed at the 
time of the military action.  Again, questions arose as to why the SAS failed to arrest the 
two men and one woman rather than shooting them (McKittrick et al, 2004; O’Brian, 
1999).  According to the SAS, the soldiers involved believed the terrorists were carrying 
a remote controlled detonator for the bomb.  The Gibraltar killings are worthy of 
investigation because they generated a retaliatory attack against British soldiers less than 
two weeks later (Geraghty, 2000).  The event is also important because it brought the 
number of IRA members killed in the one year period surrounding the event to nineteen, 
thereby delivering another severe blow to the terrorist organization (O’Brian, 1999).   
Hypotheses 
In order to evaluate whether counter terrorist strategies used during the Northern 
Irish conflict achieved the goal of reducing terrorism, I developed six hypotheses.  Since 
the literature provides considerable support for both rational choice theories, which 
predict a decrease in terrorist activity following government intervention, and legitimacy 
theories, which predict the opposite, I structured my hypotheses as two-tailed.  The first 
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four hypotheses derive from assumptions of the rational choice perspective and the final 
two pertain specifically to the Troubles.  For the first four hypotheses, a result in the 
negative direction supports the rational choice perspective, while a result in the positive 
direction supports the theory of legitimacy.  Hypothesis 1, a success related hypothesis, 
draws from the rational choice prediction that subsequent illegal behavior will diminish 
when offenders believe their chances of success have decreased.  I use the 
implementation of Falls Curfew, a certainty-based military intervention, to test 
Hypothesis 1. 
H1: Increasing the certainty of apprehension will affect the hazard of a terrorist 
attack either positively or negatively. 
Hypotheses 2a and 2b, derived from the cost-related portion of rational choice 
theory, refer to the expectation that increasing the certainty and severity of punishment 
will reduce criminal activity.  To test Hypothesis 2a, I use the implementation of Diplock 
Courts and Internment, two measures designed to increase the certainty of punishment.  
To test H2b I use the Loughall Incident and the Gibraltar Incident, two military 
interventions intended to increase the severity of punishment. 
H2a: Increasing the certainty of punishment will affect the hazard of a terrorist 
attack either positively or negatively. 
H2b: Increasing the severity of punishment will affect the hazard of a terrorist 
attack either positively or negatively. 
Hypothesis 3, regarding expected benefits, comes from the rational choice notion 
that decreasing the perceived benefits associated with terrorism will decrease future 
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criminal activity.  I use Criminalization and Ulsterization, two related policies 
implemented to decrease the benefits associated with terrorism, to test this hypothesis.  
H3: Decreasing the expected benefits associated with terrorist activity will affect 
the hazard of a terrorist attack either positively or negatively. 
Hypotheses 4a and 4b capture the idea that while the Nationalists and Loyalists 
both engaged in terrorism and were both targets of Internment, Diplock Courts and 
Criminalization/Ulsterization, only the Nationalists were targeted by the military during 
Falls Curfew, the Loughall Incident and the Gibraltar Incident.  
H4a: Internment, Diplock Courts and Criminalization/Ulsterization will affect 
both Nationalist and Loyalist activity. 
H4b: Falls Curfew, the Loughall Incident and the Gibraltar Incident will impact 
Nationalist terrorism, but will have no affect on terrorist activity engaged in by Loyalists. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Methods 
Data 
This study combines two data sources: a newly created global terrorism database 
compiled at the University of Maryland and An Index of Deaths from the Conflict in 
Northern Ireland: 1969-1993, compiled by Malcolm Sutton (1994).  The global terrorism 
database originally contained information regarding 1,751 terrorist incidents perpetrated 
by Northern Irish terror groups between 1973 and 1992.  I used Sutton’s (1994) data to 
supplement the existing database, resulting in the addition of 1,577 terrorist incidents 
occurring between 1969 and 1992.  All told, my final dataset, hereafter referred to as the 
Global Terrorism Database (GTD), contained a total of 3,328 incidents of terrorism 
perpetrated by Nationalist and Loyalist terror groups between 1969 and 1992.  Table 2 
provides a breakdown of incidents by group. 
Limitations  
To my knowledge, the GTD is the most comprehensive longitudinal data set 
available regarding terrorist activity in Northern Ireland.  However, the primary 
limitation of the data is its bounded nature.  Since the major Nationalist and Loyalist 
terrorist groups remained active until 1998, an ideal data set would include incident 
information at least until 1999.  A second limitation of the GTD is the lack of complete 
information for the years 1969 through 1972.  While the original global terrorism 
database included both fatal and non-fatal incidents, the Sutton data included only fatal 
incidents.  The inclusion of a control variable, Sutton, reduces any bias introduced into 
my statistical model through the use of multiple data sources.  However, complete data 
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during this time frame would still be preferable.  The third potential limitation of the data 
is the possibility of duplicate entries.  However, I compared each incident taken from 
Sutton (1994) against all similar incidents already contained within the global terrorism 
database to eliminate this possibility.  Fourth, there is no guarantee that every terrorist 
event was documented and no assurance that all casualties produced by each event have 
been identified.  I have addressed this potential issue by comparing incident information 
in the GTD to data collected by McKittrick et al (2004) and the CAIN Web Service.  
McKittrick et al (2004) present a collection of stories, amassed over ten years, that they 
believe encompass every death directly caused by the Troubles.  CAIN is based within 
the University of Ulster in Northern Ireland and contains information pertaining to 
incidents of terrorism during the Northern Irish conflict.  As a quality control measure, I 
compared fatality data from McKittrick et al (2004) and the CAIN Web Service with the 
fatality data from the GTD (see Figure 3).  The similarity of these sources over time 
confirms that the GTD, at least in terms of the fatalities caused by terrorism in Northern 
Ireland, appears fairly reliable.   
Model  
In order to test my hypotheses, I estimated models for three subsets of terrorist 
incidents: total terrorist activity, Nationalist terrorism and Loyalist terrorism, using the 
incident as the unit of analysis.  Per Dugan et al (2005), I estimated the coefficients 
associated with the hazard of another terrorist attack, measured by the number of days 
until the next incident perpetrated by each terrorist group (Nationalist and Loyalist).  I 
used the following specification for the hazard models in the analysis: 
h(Y)=λ0(Y) exp(β1Government Actions+ β2Context+β3Controls) 
  38
Y is a function of an unspecified baseline hazard function and other risk or protective 
variables represented by Government Actions, Context and Controls.  These vectors 
reflect my hypotheses and several control variables.   
Variables 
The dependent variable is the hazard of a terrorist attack, measured by the number 
of days until the next incident perpetrated by each terrorist group.  The independent 
variables are the precise dates relating to the six government interventions mentioned 
previously.  Each date is dummy coded such that one indicates that the policy has been 
implemented or the intervention carried out, and zero indicates that it has not.  Passive 
responses to terrorism include Diplock Courts (August 8, 1973) and 
Criminalization/Ulsterization (March 25, 1976).  Active responses to terrorism include 
Falls Curfew (July 3, 1970), Internment (August 9, 1971), the Loughall Incident (May 8, 
1987) and the Gibraltar Incident (March 6, 1988).   
I also included four variables in each of the models to measure the context of each 
incident: Success, Number Killed, Year and Sutton.  Success is a dummy variable, coded 
such that one denotes a successful attack and zero denotes an unsuccessful attack.  A 
successful attack was defined as one in which the terrorists accomplished their original 
objective.  For example, an assassination would be considered successful only if the 
intended target was killed.  Number killed relates to the number of deaths directly caused 
by each incident, ranging from zero to 26.  Year is simply the year of each incident, 
included to control for any linear trends in the data over time.  Sutton, described above, is 
a dummy variable coded such that one means the incident came from the supplemental 
data source, and zero indicates it was present in the original global terrorism database.  
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This crucial addition to the model controls not only for possible bias introduced by using 
two different data sources but for the possibility that information on the early years of the 
conflict, 1969 to 1972, is fundamentally different from information in the rest of the data.  
I added one additional variable, Nationalist Group, to the model which includes all 
terrorist incidents.  Nationalist Group is a dummy variable where one denotes a 
Nationalist group and zero indicates a Loyalist group.  The inclusion of this variable 
allows the average dependent variable to differ for Nationalist and Loyalist groups.   
Finally, I included a number of statistical controls in the analysis to isolate the 
effects of the counter terrorist actions on the levels of terrorism.  Three of these control 
variables are typically used by researchers when conducting analyses of violent crime 
trends (see LaFree, 1999; Neuman & Berger, 1988).  First, I included a measure of 
economic production, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the United Kingdom.  
Information regarding the GDP was obtained through the United Nations Statistics 
Division and is listed in constant prices, as is typical of recent research on violent crime 
(Neumayer, 2005).  Although ideally I would have preferred to control for the GDP of 
Northern Ireland alone, that measure was not available for the entire timeframe of my 
study.  Second, I added the homicide rate of Northern Ireland using World Health 
Organization data obtained from LaFree (2005) and third, I included data on crimes 
recorded by the police in Northern Ireland, obtained from the British Home Office.  I 
included one additional variable, Bloody Sunday, in all three models to control for the 
possible escalation effects of Bloody Sunday on subsequent terrorism in Northern 
Ireland.  See Table 3 for summary statistics on all variables included in the models. 
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Hazard Modeling 
 
 In order to estimate the impact of the six selected policies and military 
interventions on the hazard of subsequent terrorist attacks, I used Cox (1972) 
proportional hazard models.  Hazard modeling was originally designed to be applied to 
the study of one-time events such as death; however, it has also been used to investigate 
the effects of repeated events, such as earthquakes, car accidents, stock market crashes, 
arrests and revolutions (Allison, 1995).  Most commonly, the Cox hazard model is used 
to estimate the hazard of a single event using many observations.  My approach, taken 
from Dugan et al (2005), expands upon previous research by estimating the hazard of 
many events (terrorist attacks), on only one or two observations (the type of terrorist 
group).  By conditioning all events on one or two observations, I reduce the risk of 
dependence across observations.  As suggested by Allison (1995), I further tested for 
dependence by including in the models a variable that measures the time since the last 
incident.  If there was dependence across incidents it would be strongest for the most 
recent attempts.  The null association of this variable (p=0.50) supports the assumption 
that the observations are conditionally independent.  Given this conditional 
independence, the multiple events in the current model will be akin to the more typical 
hazard model’s multiple observations (Dugan et al, 2005).   
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CHAPTER 5 
Results 
Trends in Terrorism 
Figure 4 shows trends in total terrorist activity over time while Figure 5 breaks 
this information down by group.  For illustrative purposes, these figures include 
indicators representing the six government interventions analyzed here.  The large 
increase in incidents, from less than a handful in 1969 to nearly 300 in 1972, conveys the 
intensity of escalation during the early years of the conflict.  Not surprisingly, during the 
first five years of the Troubles, authorities responded with three disparate counter 
terrorist interventions (Falls Curfew, Internment and Diplock Courts).  Although the 
years following 1972 witnessed a substantial decline in activity, the reprieve proved only 
temporary when in 1979, terrorist activity spiked again.  The comparison between 
Nationalist and Loyalist activity presented in Figure 5 reveals that the spike in 1979 is 
almost entirely attributable to Nationalist groups.  Indeed, during a single day in March of 
1979, the IRA detonated 24 bombs at different locations throughout Northern Ireland 
(McKittrick et al, 2004).  As seen in Figure 5, throughout the 1980s Loyalist activity fell 
to relatively minimal levels while Nationalist activity continued to fluctuate erratically.  It 
is interesting to note that apart from minor legislative action, terrorists were met with 
little governmental retaliation during this time.  During the late 1980s, around the time of 
the British military interventions at Loughall and Gibraltar, both Nationalist and Loyalist 
levels of terrorism rose rather substantially.  This dramatic increase continued into 1992, 
the final year of this study.   
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Offering a different perspective on the Troubles, Figures 6 and 7 illustrate the 
number of deaths attributable to terrorism over time.  During 1972, the single deadliest 
year of the Troubles, nearly 300 deaths were attributed to Nationalist terrorism.  
Although Loyalist killings also spiked in 1972, Loyalists caused their greatest number of 
fatalities in 1975.  Interestingly, 1975, one year prior to the implementation of 
Criminalization and Ulsterization, was the first year of the Troubles wherein the carnage 
caused by Loyalist terror groups nearly equaled that caused by Nationalists.  This pattern 
was not repeated again until 1992.   
Apart from the dramatic spike in the early 1970s, the pattern of terrorist killings 
differs greatly from the patterns in total activity described above.  As opposed to the 
extreme fluctuation in incidents throughout the 1980s (especially on the part of 
Nationalist groups), the lethality of terrorist events decreased drastically for both groups 
in 1977, and continued to diminish until 1979, when there was a slight increase for both 
groups.  The minor spike in fatalities in 1979 was followed by a steady, seven-year 
decline in fatal violence throughout the 1980s, especially noticeable for Nationalist 
groups.  Not surprisingly, when this decline came to an abrupt end in 1987, British 
military action targeting Nationalists was quick to follow (see Figure 7).  The late 1980s 
and early 1990s witnessed an unusual pattern of violence for Nationalists and Loyalists, 
with Nationalist killings actually decreasing as Loyalist killings increased.  The decline in 
fatalities associated with Nationalist terrorism is unexpected, given the concurrent rise in 
overall incidents during that time (see Figure 5).  Although the analysis presented in this 
paper does not address possible reasons for this disparity; an interesting future research 
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project might explore the possibility of a link between this rise in non-fatal incidents and 
changes in Nationalist modes of attack.   
Statistical Analysis 
Table 4 shows the hazard model results for total incidents, Nationalist perpetrated 
incidents and Loyalist perpetrated incidents.  In each model, a positive coefficient 
suggests that the variable increases the hazard of another terrorist attack, lending support 
to legitimacy theories, while a negative value suggests it decreases the hazard of another 
attack, lending support to rational choice theories.  Derived from an assumption of 
rational choice theory, Hypothesis 1 predicts that the hazard of a terrorist attack will 
change following the implementation of counter terrorist measures that increase the 
certainty of apprehension.  I examined the effect of a single certainty-based measure: 
Falls Curfew, occurring in July of 1970.  The hazard model results show partial support 
for Hypothesis 1 and the theory of legitimacy.  Falls Curfew was related to a significant 
increase in Nationalist activity as well as non-significant increases in Loyalist activity 
and total terrorism.  However, I should note that the differences in magnitude between the 
coefficients in the Nationalist model (1.484) and the Loyalist model (1.011) were not 
significantly different from one another (z=0.47; see Paternoster, Brame, Mazerolle, and 
Piquero 1998 for test).  
Hypotheses 2a and 2b are drawn from the cost-related portion of rational choice 
theory.  Hypothesis 2a predicts that as the certainty of punishment increases, the hazard 
of a terrorist attack will change.  In order to address this possibility, I analyzed the 
implementation of two counter terrorist policies: Diplock Courts, in August of 1973 and 
Internment, in August of 1971.  Both policies increased the certainty of punishment for 
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committing the crime of terrorism either by altering the trial process (Diplock Courts) or 
by eliminating it altogether (Internment).  The results of the analysis provide support for 
Hypothesis 2a.  Supportive of H2a and the rational choice perspective, the 
implementation of Diplock Courts was related to a decrease in the hazard of terrorism in 
all three models; however, this decrease was only significant for Loyalist groups.  
Interestingly, a z-test confirms that the implementation of Diplock Courts affected 
Loyalist activity significantly more than it affected Nationalist activity (z=2.17).  The 
implementation of Internment had the opposite effect on the hazard of terrorism, 
significantly increasing the hazard of a Nationalist attack as well as terrorism overall.  
These findings run contrary to the expectations of rational choice theorists, however, they 
support theories of legitimacy.  The implementation of Internment resulted in a decrease 
in Loyalist activity, however this change was non-significant.  The coefficients for the 
Nationalist model and the Loyalist model were significantly different (z=2.90).  It is 
interesting to note that the Internment variable produced the largest significant 
coefficient, positive or negative, of any of the six government actions evaluated.      
Hypothesis 2b predicts that as a counter terrorist measure increases the severity of 
punishment, the hazard of another terrorist attack will change.  I tested this assertion by 
examining two military interventions that increased the perceived costs of engaging in 
terrorism: the Loughall Incident, occurring in May of 1987 and the Gibraltar Incident, 
taking place in March of 1988.  My findings regarding these two interventions provide 
strong support for H2b and the legitimacy perspective.  For all three models, the Loughall 
Incident was related to an increase in the hazard of another terrorist attack.  This increase 
was significant for both Nationalist and Loyalist groups, but insignificant for terrorism 
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overall.  A z-test confirmed that the increase in Nationalist activity was not significantly 
different from the increase in Loyalist activity (z=1.01).  The Gibraltar Incident was also 
related to a significant increase in both overall terrorist activity and Nationalist terrorism; 
however, it was not related to any significant change in terrorism perpetrated by 
Loyalists.  The coefficient for the Nationalist model differs significantly from the 
coefficient for the Loyalist model (z=2.46).  
My next hypothesis (H3) examines the impact of the perceived benefits of 
terrorism on the hazard of another terrorist attack.  Hypothesis 3 posits that the hazard of 
a terrorist attack will change when an intervention decreases the expected benefits 
associated with terrorist activity.  In order to evaluate this assertion, I analyzed the 
implementation of Criminalization and Ulsterization in March of 1976.  The British 
government designed theses policies to decrease the benefits associated with engaging in 
terrorism.  Supportive of Hypothesis 3 and the legitimacy perspective, Criminalization 
and Ulsterization were related to a significant increase in the hazard of a terrorist attack 
for Nationalist groups as well as for terrorism overall.  By contrast, terrorism perpetrated 
by Loyalists decreased (but not significantly so) following the implementation of the 
policies.  The coefficients for Nationalist and Loyalist activity were significantly 
different, providing stronger support for the increased hazard of Nationalist terrorism 
(z=2.84). 
Finally, hypotheses 4a and 4b address the potential differences between Northern 
Irish Nationalist and Loyalist terror groups in their responses to counter terrorist actions.  
As mentioned previously, one active response (Internment) and two passive responses 
(Diplock Courts and Criminalization/Ulsterization) were aimed at fighting terrorism in 
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general, while the remaining three active, military-oriented responses (Falls Curfew, the 
Loughall Incident and the Gibraltar Incident) were targeted at Nationalist groups in 
particular.  Hypothesis 4a posits that Internment, Diplock Courts and 
Criminalization/Ulsterization should affect both Nationalist and Loyalist activity.  I tested 
this hypothesis by evaluating the effect of each of the three interventions on subsequent 
Nationalist and Loyalist terrorism.  Failing to support Hypothesis 4a, Internment 
significantly increased the hazard of Nationalist perpetrated terrorism while having no 
significant effect on Loyalist activity.  A z-test also indicates that statistically, the 
coefficients in the Nationalist model are significantly different than the coefficients in the 
Loyalist model (z=2.90).  This confirms that the groups were not affected similarly by the 
intervention.  The results of the analysis with regard to Criminalization and Ulsterization 
also fail to support H4a, as the policies only significantly affected Nationalist activity.  
Finally, providing some support for Hypothesis 4a, the implementation of Diplock Courts 
decreased the hazard of both Nationalist and Loyalist terrorism.  As mentioned above 
however, a z-test revealed that Loyalist activity decreased significantly more than 
Nationalist activity.   
Three active, military interventions: Falls Curfew, the Loughall Incident and the 
Gibraltar Incident, were used to test Hypothesis 4b.  H4b predicts that because the 
aforementioned government actions directly targeted Nationalist terrorists (the IRA), they 
should only affect Nationalist terrorism.  This hypothesis received partial support.  
Supportive of the Hypothesis 4b, the Gibraltar Incident significantly impacted terrorism 
perpetrated by Nationalist groups, while Loyalist activity was not affected.  The z-score, 
mentioned above, adds additional support to the finding that Nationalists were affected 
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more strongly by the intervention than Loyalists.  Offering partial support to H4b, Falls 
Curfew significantly affected only Nationalist terrorism.  However, the z-test presented 
above shows there was actually no significant difference between the coefficients in the 
Nationalist and Loyalist models.  Finally, as I suspected, the Loughall Incident 
significantly affected Nationalist terrorism.  The surprising result is that the military 
intervention also affected Loyalists.  Further testing confirmed that the Loughall Incident 
did not even affect Nationalists more strongly than Loyalists (z=1.01).  These findings 
are contrary to Hypothesis 4b.   
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CHAPTER 6 
Discussion and Conclusions 
In this paper I developed six hypotheses regarding terrorist activity and the 
Northern Irish Troubles.  I used a chronological index of deaths from the conflict, as well 
as data from a newly created global terrorism database, to determine whether government 
intervention reduced or increased terrorism.  I also examined whether Nationalist and 
Loyalist groups responded differently to various types of counter terrorist action.  The six 
government interventions selected for this paper targeted the certainty of apprehension, 
the certainty and severity of punishment and the perceived benefits of engaging in 
terrorism.  Overall, I found more support for the theory of governmental legitimacy than 
for the rational choice perspective, indicating that counter terrorist activity may be 
counter productive, especially when it involves military force.  
The first major military intervention of the Troubles, Falls Curfew, resulted in a 
significantly greater hazard of Nationalist terrorism.  Given the nature of the search 
operation, the failure of this intervention to reduce terrorism is not entirely surprising.  
During the curfew, the army successfully disarmed and incapacitated a number of 
potentially dangerous terrorists, effectively raising the certainty of apprehension.  
However, the positive effects of the army’s efforts were apparently mitigated by their 
questionable handling of the situation.  The unprovoked ransacking of private homes and 
the killing of civilians likely generated considerable animosity toward the government.  
In turn, this animosity may have increased support for terrorists among the local 
population.  As suggested by Braithwaite (2002), deterrence may not always work as the 
rational choice perspective predicts.  Perhaps Falls Curfew is one case in which the 
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negative slope of the defiance curve was steeper than the positive slope of the deterrence 
curve.  This finding also provides support for Tyler’s (2000) assertion that perceptions of 
government legitimacy stem from the level of fairness people associate with government 
policies rather than the actual outcome of the policy.  Although the curfew achieved 
many of the government’s intended goals, it was also conducted in a manner that those 
affected perceived as unfair.   
The intriguing finding with regard to Diplock Courts is that they were 
significantly more effective in decreasing Loyalist activity than Nationalist activity.  
While the added costs of engaging in terrorism appear to have dissuaded Loyalists, 
Nationalists remained virtually undeterred.  This result implies a fundamental difference 
between the two groups in perceptions of the cost-benefit ratio associated with engaging 
in terrorism.  I suspect that Loyalists were more easily deterred because their cause, 
maintaining the union with Britain, is not as deeply ingrained in Irish history as the cause 
of the Nationalists (thus Loyalists receive fewer benefits from terrorist activity).  As a 
result, Loyalist groups may have fewer highly motivated individuals who are capable of 
ignoring the rising costs of engaging in terrorism.   
The most definitive result of the entire analysis is the resounding failure of the 
Internment policy.  In both the Nationalist model and the total terrorism model, the 
implementation of Internment produced a significant increase in the hazard of a terrorist 
attack.  The rational choice assumption that deterrence results from an increased certainty 
of punishment simply does not hold in this case.  Perhaps, as Braithwaite (2002) and 
Tyler (2000) suggest, theories of legitimacy can more adequately explain the effects of 
Internment.  The erroneous arrests of non-terrorists during the initial day of Internment 
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likely undermined the legitimacy of the sanctioning agents.  Additionally, the policy of 
internment without trial is, by definition, unfair. 
The aggravating effects of the Loughall and Gibraltar Incidents on Nationalist 
terrorism contradict the assumptions of rational choice theories.  Given the high loss of 
life suffered by the IRA in Loughall and Gibraltar, rational choice theorists would 
anticipate a lull in terrorist activity while the organization regrouped.  The extreme 
severity of punishment surely did not go unnoticed by other terrorists, yet the escalation 
of incidents following the event fails to suggest a deterrent effect.  Indeed, compromised 
government legitimacy appears a more plausible explanation.  Since the terrorists were 
killed, rather than arrested by the army, there were whispers of a shoot-to-kill policy 
among British security forces (Geraghty, 2000).  Always aware of the value of 
propaganda, perhaps the IRA portrayed the ‘murdered’ terrorists as martyrs (Geraghty, 
2000).  Lethal force may have been perceived as unnecessary and the killings therefore 
unjust.  Regardless, the findings provide support for legitimacy theories rather than 
rational choice theories. 
  The aggravating effect of the Loughall Incident on Loyalist terrorism is 
puzzling.  I can conceive of no theoretical reason for this finding, as the intervention 
targeted only the IRA (a Nationalist group).  Perhaps Loyalists were simply caught up in 
retaliatory attacks against Nationalists during the increase in Nationalist violence that 
followed the military action.   
From a rational choice standpoint, the simultaneous decrease in benefits and 
increase in costs of Criminalization and Ulsterization should have produced a deterrent 
effect for both groups.  However, the deterrent effect proved insignificant for Loyalist 
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groups and non-existent for Nationalists.  Again, similar to the results of the analysis of 
Diplock Courts, the results regarding Criminalization and Ulsterization hint at some 
fundamental difference between Nationalists and Loyalists.  Perhaps the Nationalists’ 
unwavering commitment to their cause, as evidenced by the hunger strikes in 1981, sets 
them apart.  While I hesitate to imply that Loyalist terror groups were more rational than 
Nationalists, the Loyalists did appear more responsive to changes in the cost-benefit ratio 
associated with terrorist activity.  Maybe, as Shultz (1979) suggests, Nationalist groups 
were simply so driven by ideology and emotion, that they were willing to incur costs 
above and beyond the point of rationality.  Alternatively, perhaps the animosity harbored 
by Nationalists against a government they perceived as illegitimate was simply 
aggravated by the introduction of each new counter measure. 
All in all, these results support two main conclusions.  First, I failed to find 
support for the rational choice assumption that terrorist attacks decrease in likelihood 
when the certainty of apprehension or the certainty and severity of punishment increase.  
On the contrary, I found that four of the five interventions used to test this assumption 
(Falls Curfew, Internment, the Loughall Incident and the Gibraltar Incident) significantly 
increased the risk of another terrorist attack in at least one of the models.  Just as violence 
spiked dramatically in the early 1970s, Britain intervened with Falls Curfew and 
Internment, two repressive military interventions that served to exacerbate the conflict.  
Military action at Loughall and Gibraltar also increased, rather than reduced violence in 
the late 1980s.  Only the introduction of Diplock Courts in 1973 effectively reduced the 
activity of some groups.  These results indicate that retaliating against terrorists with 
military force is counter productive, and should be avoided.  Governments must 
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anticipate the possibility that the consequences of military counter terrorist action may be 
as severe as the consequences of additional terrorism and must take extreme care to 
weigh the benefits of violence against the costs of potentially escalating the conflict.   
Secondly, I ascertained that Nationalist terror groups, consistently more violent 
than Loyalists, were virtually undeterred in their campaign of terror.  Regardless of arrest, 
imprisonment, condemnation by authorities and death of their members, Nationalist 
organizations did not falter in their relentless stream of attacks.  The interventions 
examined here not only failed to diminish Nationalist terrorism, five of the six resulted in 
significantly increased terrorist activity.  The desire for vengeance against British 
authorities, stemming from the security forces’ lack of neutrality in handling the 
situation, likely provided a powerful motivation for Nationalist terrorists and future 
recruits to Nationalist groups.  Ultimately, while my results provide minimal evidence for 
the rational choice perspective and the effectiveness of deterrence-based counter 
terrorism, they provide strong support for theories of governmental legitimacy.  In the 
future, perhaps legitimacy theories will offer a more complete understanding of the 
apparent counter productivity of counter terrorism as it applies to Irish Nationalists.   
Despite the strength of the database created for this research, my study has several 
limitations.  First, it suffers from a shortcoming common to many previous tests of the 
rational choice perspective: a lack of perceptual data regarding the specific motivations of 
terrorists (Dugan et al, 2005).  As a result, I had no way of knowing whether Nationalists 
remained motivated by the original goal of a united Ireland, or if at some point they 
began acting out of revenge, hatred toward the authorities, or simply for the exhilaration 
of the experience.  Unfortunately, this limitation precludes a complete understanding of 
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the benefits expected by terrorists, as well as their perception of government sanctions.  
Second, I was unable to obtain a measure of social attitudes in Northern Ireland that 
could speak to changing levels of public support for paramilitary campaigns.  This 
addition may have been useful in understanding perceptions of government legitimacy.  
Third, though I attempted to account for many of the variables determined in prior 
research to be associated with terrorist activity, it is possible that I neglected to include an 
important additional measure.  Finally, as a case study, the external validity of this 
research is limited.  However, although my research is unique in geographical location 
and data source, the findings align my research with previous studies that conclude that 
military counter terrorism is counterproductive (see Collins, 2004; Geraghty, 2000; 
Kenney, 2003; Lichbach, 1987; Malvesti, 2002; Nevin, 2003; Soule, 1989; Turk, 2002).   
Suggestions for Future Research 
My research represents an initial application of hazard modeling and legitimacy 
theories to terrorist activity in Northern Ireland.  Accordingly, numerous potential 
projects could expand upon the current findings.  First, the bounded nature of this 
research prevented me from examining the effects of one major government intervention, 
the Good Friday Agreement, reached on April 10, 1998.  When more complete data 
becomes available, future research should examine the entire span of the Northern Irish 
Troubles, from 1969 until after the peace agreement in 1998.  Second, I believe an 
extremely interesting future research project would be an analysis of terrorism and 
counter terrorism in Northern Ireland using fatalities, rather than incidents, as the 
dependent measure.  As mentioned previously, while the number of terrorist attacks 
fluctuated fairly erratically from year to year, the number of fatalities decreased markedly 
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over time.  Had I analyzed the impact of government interventions on the lethality of 
attacks rather than on the attacks themselves, my results may have been different.  Third, 
I envision a more in depth analysis of attack mode, target type and choice of weapon.  
This analysis could determine whether the single outwardly successful policy identified 
in this paper (Diplock Courts) generated substitution effects, as cautioned by Cauley and 
Im (1988).  Fourth, in agreement with Dugan et al (2005) I suggest a more thorough 
evaluation of the differences between terrorists and ordinary criminals in their 
perceptions of costs and benefits before drawing further conclusions regarding terrorism 
and the rational choice perspective.  Finally, I suggest further exploration of the 
applicability of legitimacy theories to terrorism.  Public attitudes toward the British Army 
and the RUC, gleaned from attitudinal surveys, speak directly to perceptions of 
legitimacy over time.  Similarly, an analysis of attitudes toward terrorism might correlate 
trends in recruitment with upswings in terrorist activity.  Attitudinal surveys for Northern 
Ireland are available, though potentially difficult to obtain, for the later years of the 
Troubles.   
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TABLES 
 
Table 1. Description of Interventions Selected for Analysis. 
Date  Intervention Description and Intended Effect Response Type 
 
July 3, 1970 Falls Curfew 36 hour military curfew imposed by the 
British government.  337 people were 
arrested and four killed.  Falls Curfew 
was intended to increase terrorists’ 
perceived certainty of apprehension.  
 
Active 
August 9, 1971 Internment Imprisonment without trial.  During the 
Internment period nearly 2,000 people 
were jailed without a conviction.  
Internment was intended to increase 
terrorists’ perceived certainty of 
punishment. 
 
Active 
August 8, 1973 Diplock Courts Juryless courts were designed to handle 
cases involving suspected terrorists.  
Diplock Courts were intended to 
increase terrorists’ perceived certainty 
of punishment. 
 
Passive 
March 25, 1976 Criminalization/ 
Ulsterization 
Jailed terrorists were treated as 
criminals rather than political prisoners 
and primary responsibility for the 
security situation shifted from the army 
to the police force.  Criminalization 
and Ulsterization were intended to 
decrease the benefits associated with 
terrorism. 
 
Passive 
May 8, 1987 The Loughall 
Incident 
Eight IRA members were killed by the 
SAS.  This was the highest loss of life 
suffered by the IRA in any single 
incident.  The incident was intended to 
increase terrorists’ perceived severity 
of punishment. 
 
Active 
March 6, 1988 The Gibraltar 
Incident 
Three IRA members were killed by the 
SAS.  The incident was controversial 
because witnesses claimed the SAS 
gave no warning.  It was intended to 
increase terrorists’ perceived severity 
of punishment. 
Active 
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Table 2. Number of Terrorist Incidents by Group. 
Group Name Number of 
Incidents 
Percent of  
Overall Total 
Nationalists   
        Irish Republican Army (IRA) 2,362 70.97 
        Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) 102 3.07 
        Official Irish Republican Army (OIRA)  42 1.26 
        Irish People’s Liberation Organization (IPLO) 20 0.60 
        Non-specific Nationalist Terrorists 76 2.28 
        Total Nationalist Incidents 2,602 78.18 
Loyalists   
        Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) 238 7.15 
        Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) 179 5.38 
        Non-specific Loyalist Terrorists 309 9.29 
        Total Loyalist Incidents 726 21.82 
Overall Total  3,328 100.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Summary Statistics for all Included Variables. 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum 
Value 
Maximum 
Value 
Interventions     
        Falls Curfew 0.997 0.057 0 1 
        Internment 0.286 0.452 0 1 
        Diplock Courts 0.843 0.364 0 1 
        Criminalization/Ulsterization 0.683 0.465 0 1 
        The Loughall Incident 0.268 0.443 0 1 
        The Gibraltar Incident 0.247 0.431 0 1 
Context     
        Success 0.879 0.326 0 1 
        Number Killed 0.890 1.250 0 26 
        Year  1980.855 6.801 1969 1992 
        Sutton 0.474 0.499 0 1 
Controls     
        Gross Domestic Product    451.765     65.168    344.553   557.300 
        Homicide Rate 7.014 3.668 0.848 14.311 
        Crimes Recorded by Police    507.911    129.898    228.680   682.550 
        Bloody Sunday 0.968 0.176 0 1 
        Nationalist Group 0.747 0.435 0 1 
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Table 4. Coefficients for Cox Proportional Hazard Models. 
 All 
Incidents 
N=3,328 
Nationalist 
Incidents 
n=2,602 
Loyalist  
Incidents 
n=726 
Government Actions    
Falls Curfew 0.818 
0.556 
 1.484* 
0.743 
1.011 
0.692 
Internmenta     1.573** 
0.327 
   0.930** 
0.267 
          -0.042 
0.203 
 
Diplock Courtsa             -0.095 
0.236 
          -0.176 
0.183 
  -0.756** 
0.194 
 
Criminalization/Ulsterizationa  0.939* 
0.376 
  0.631* 
0.299 
          -0.437 
0.228 
 
The Loughall Incident 0.503 
0.272 
    0.597** 
0.231 
   1.031** 
0.361 
 
The Gibraltar Incidenta     0.908** 
0.273 
    0.780** 
0.236 
          -0.333 
0.385 
Context    
Success -0.022 
0.121 
          -0.019 
0.099 
          -0.181 
0.171 
 
Number Killed           -0.005 
0.030 
          -0.012 
0.025 
 0.062* 
0.029 
 
Year    -0.284** 
0.091 
  -0.230** 
0.077 
   0.332** 
0.117 
 
Sutton 
 
           -0.056 
0.097 
          -0.156 
0.084 
  -0.439** 
0.182 
Controls    
Gross Domestic Product   0.011* 
0.006 
0.007 
0.005 
  -0.031** 
0.007 
 
Homicide Rate 0.037 
0.019 
0.015 
0.016 
0.032 
0.021 
 
Crimes Recorded by Police    0.007** 
0.002 
   0.006** 
0.002 
 -0.007* 
0.003 
 
Bloody Sunday 
 
0.135 
0.317 
0.568 
0.291 
   2.812** 
0.474 
 
Nationalist Group -0.174 
0.099 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
*p≤0.05 and **p≤0.01, all two tailed tests.  Standard errors are listed below coefficients. 
a Denotes interventions that affected Nationalists and Loyalists significantly differently. 
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FIGURES 
 
Figure 1. Terrorist Activity by Group. 
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Figure 2. Total Killings by Group. 
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Figure 3. Total Killings by Data Source. 
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Figure 4. Overlay of Interventions on Total Terrorist Activity. 
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Figure 5. Overlay of Interventions on Terrorist Activity by Group. 
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Figure 6. Overlay of Interventions on Total Killings. 
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Figure 7. Overlay of Interventions on Killings by Group. 
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